

## Message Text

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21

ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 AF-06 EUR-12 ISO-00 IO-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01

SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 OMB-01 SAB-01 SAM-01 AID-05 /092 W

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R 220820Z JUL 75

FM AMEMBASSY SANA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6013

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY DHAHREN

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY JIDD

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

USCINCEUR

COMIDEASTFOR

S E C R E T SANA 1986

BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: ARAB DIPLOMACY TOWARD PDRY

1. SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO YAR FOREIGN MINISTER ABDALLAH AL-ASNAG, ARAB DIPLOMACY IS PRESENTING PDRY WITH ATTRACTIVE BUT DIFFICULT CHOICES. BELIEVE MATTER SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED IN JIDDA AND MIGHT ALSO BE RAISED IN CAIRO.

END SUMMARY.

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2. DURING JULY 20 MEETING, YAR FOREIGN MINISTER ABDALLAH AL-ASNAG DESCRIBED TO AMBASSADOR RESULTS OF RECENT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN SAG OFFICIALS AND PDRY FOREIGN MINISTER MUTIH AT RECENT JIDDA ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE. DISCUSSIONS HAVE LED TO RESTATEMENT OF FOUR CONDITIONS FOR SAUDI RECOGNITION OF AND AID TO SOUTH YEMENI REGIME.

3. CONDITIONS ARE (1) RETURN OF SOUTH YEMENI EXILES AND THEIR PARTICIPATION IN MEANINGFUL WAY IN GOVERNMENT IN ADEN (2) END OF WAR, (3) "DIMINUTION" OF SOVIET PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE AND (4) HALT OF SOUTH YEMENI INSPIRED ATTACKS AND SUBVERSION IN SOUTHERN AREA OF YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC.

4. SAUDIS ARE APPARENTLY PREPARED TO OFFER MEANINGFUL AID, AND ACCEPT THE PRESENT REGIME--"LET THEM RULE" SAID ASNAG A BIT DERISIVELY--IN RETURN FOR ADENI IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE CONDITIONS. ASNAG DID NOT CITE ANY AID FIGURES BUT, IN RESPONSE TO QUERY, SAID HE PERSONALLY DID NOT FEAR THAT SOUTH YEMENIS WOULD BE TREATED LIKE PRODIGAL SON AND END UP BENEFITTING MORE THAN YAR. ASNAG ALSO SAID THAT HE BELIEVED ACCEPTANCE OF THE SAUDI CONDITIONS BY THE SOUTH WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE GOOD FOR "US", C BY WHICH HE MEANT THE HAMDI GOVERNMENT OF NORTH YEMEN.

5. ASNAG SAID THAT AT THE ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE SOUTH YEMENI FOREIGN MINISTER MUTIH WAS ISOLATED AND HE, ASNAG, HAD TO SPONSOR HIM AND "TAKE HIM AROUND". AL-ASNAG SAID THAT AT PRESENT SOUTH YEMENIS ARE "CONFUSED" AND UNCERTAIN ABOUT COURSE THEY SHOULD TAKE. NOT ONLY ARE THE SAUDIS AND THE HAMDI REGIME PRESSURING THE ADENI GOVERNMENT BUT THE EGYPTIANS AND OTHERS IN THE GULF ARE AS WELL. ASNAG, WHO SAID HE DID HIS PART BY TALKING TO THE BAHRAINIS AND KUWAITIS ABOUT THIS STRATEGY, BELIEVES THE ADENI REGIME IS SOFTENING. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE CURRENT ARAB STRATEGY WOULD SUCCEED, ALTHOUGH HE DIDN'T HAZARD A GUESS AS TO HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE. HE NOTED THAT ONE RECENT FRUIT OF SAUDI EFFORTS HAS BEEN THE

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INAUGURATION OF DIRECT FLIGHTS BY SAUDIA AND YAMDA BETWEEN ADEN AND JIDDA.

6. INTERESTINGLY, ASNAG DID NOT RPT NOT SEE THE DECISION TO REORIENT SOUTH YEMEN AS INVOLVING A CONFLICT BETWEEN ISMAIL AND SALIM ALI, WHO HE SAID ARE CLOSE ON BASIC POLITICAL MATTERS AND NOT SUCH BITTER RIVALS AS GENERALLY REPRESENTED. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT, IN ANY CASE, ISMAIL

COULD NOT STAND UP TO SALIM ALIN IN A CONFLICT  
BECAUSE SALIM'S CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES AND  
THE SECURITY BRANCHES PUT HIM IN A POSITION TO  
"DRAG ISMAIL OUT OF HIS HOUSE ANY TIME HE WANTS".  
ASNAG SAID THAT AFTER ANY RECONCILIATION OF SOUTH  
YEMEN WITH THE SAUDIS AND THE YAR, HOWEVER ISMAIL  
WOULD SIMPLY "FADEAWAY" SINCE HE REPRESENTS A POLICY  
OF RADICALIZATION OF THE YAR AND OTHER CONTIGUOUS  
PENINSULA AREAS.

7. COMMENT: IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT THE SAUDIS DID  
NOT INCLUDE IN THEIR CONDITIONS ANY OF THEIR OUTSTANDING  
BILATERAL DIFFERENCES WITH SOUTH YEMEN: BORDERS,  
AND SOUTH YEMEN'S LEFTIST POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION.  
SAUDIS SEEM TO BE FOCUSING INSTEAD ON CHANGES IN SOUTH  
YEMEN'S RELATIONS NOT WITH SAUDI ARABIA BUT WITH OTHER  
STATES: THE YAR, THE SOVIET UNION, OMAN. THIS  
GREATLY DILUTES THE EARLIER SAUDI POSITIONS BACKED BY FAISAL:  
OVERTHROW OF THE ADEN REGIME, TOTAL EXPULSION OF THE SOVIETS,  
AND PERHAPS SEVERAL STATES IN PLACE OF THE UNITARY  
GOVERNMENT OF PDRY. BOTH SAUDIS AND ASNAG DOUBTLESS  
EXPECT HOWEVER, THAT ANY RETURN OF SOUTH YEMENI EXILES  
WILL HAVE A PROFOUND IMPACT ON THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION  
OF PDRY OVER LONGER RUN. ASNAG'S OPTIMISM ABOUT THE CHOICE  
WHICH THE SOUTH YEMENIS WILL EVENTUALLY MAKE IS GOING TO DEPEND,  
IN MY VIEW, ON A FIRM SAUDI OFFER OF A LOT MORE MONEY THAN HAS  
SEEN THE LIGHT OF DAY SO FAR. THE \$40 MILLION WHICH  
THE EGYPTIANS PRESUMABLY CHANNELED TO ADEN IS BARELY MORE  
THAN AN ANTE. A REAL CHANGE IN PDRY IS ALSO GOING TO  
DEPEND ON THE SAUDIS STICKING TO THEIR PRESENT CONDITIONS,  
SOMETHING ASNAG SEEMS TO THINK THEY MIGHT NOT DO. IN ANY  
CASE, WITH ISSUE APPARENTLY IN BALANCE, I THINK IT WOULD BE  
USEFUL FOR JIDDA TO INITIATE A GENERAL AND THOROUGH DISCUSSION

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OF MATTER WITH FAHD AND SAUD BIN FAISAL TO ASCERTAIN WHERE  
THE SAUDIS BELIEVE THEY NOW ARE AND WHERE THEY INTEND  
TO GO WITH PDRY. SUBJECT TO PRESS OF OTHER BUSINESS IN  
CAIRO, SIMILAR DISCUSSIONS COULD USEFULLY BE HELD WITH  
EGYPTIANS.

SCOTES

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